At the Cabinet meeting of 8 April, the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) presented a detailed analysis of the Government’s interventions to safeguard the energy security of the Republic of Moldova. The crisis in the energy sector should not be viewed as an isolated event related solely to the Vulcănești–Isaccea overhead transmission line, but rather as a sequence of external shocks that required a gradual, decisive, and strategically oriented response focused on protecting citizens.

As early as the beginning of March 2026, risk indicators signaled the first vulnerabilities in the fuel supply system. Through Government Decision No. 81/2026, an alert state was declared in the energy sector.

At this stage, the primary objective was to monitor fuel stocks and prepare for a potential shortage. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz—through which approximately 20% of global oil and 25–30% of liquefied natural gas (LNG) pass—began to trigger a shockwave across international energy markets. At the same time, the regional situation was already under pressure due to maintenance works at Romanian refineries, the Republic of Moldova’s main source of fuel imports, accounting for 78% of diesel imports and 99% of gasoline imports, significantly limiting the volumes available for import.

Although the alert state had been activated, the instruments available under this mechanism were purely administrative. Under this framework, the Government had no legal authority to intervene in the fuel pricing methodology, grant exemptions from the Urban Planning Code for renewable energy projects, protect energy suppliers from the freezing of bank accounts, or conduct emergency procurement.

It should be emphasized that by the time the state of emergency was declared, the national situation had already become critical. Global developments and regional pressures had transformed existing vulnerabilities into an acute crisis. Moreover, the diesel pricing methodology, based on a 14-day average, had become a barrier: importers no longer had an incentive to bring fuel into the country when they were required to sell it at prices calculated on the basis of outdated quotations. At that stage, the issue was no longer the final price for consumers, but the very availability of fuel at filling stations. The market was on the verge of paralysis, and the administrative tools provided under the alert state were no longer sufficient to ensure supply.

Against this already challenging backdrop, a turning point occurred on 23 March 2026, when Russian attacks on infrastructure in southern Ukraine disabled the 400 kV Vulcănești–Isaccea transmission line, which normally supplied approximately 60–70% of the country’s electricity demand. Electricity flows from Romania rapidly dropped to 0 MW, creating a massive deficit of 350–400 MW per hour.

A state of emergency was declared under Parliament Decision No. 38/2026, enabling the Government to activate additional legal instruments. This allowed action on two major fronts:

1. The electricity sector, to ensure uninterrupted electricity supply to households;
2. The petroleum products sector, to move from fuel shortages to market stability.

In the electricity sector, the state of emergency enabled:

• Rapid emergency repairs. State-owned enterprise Moldelectrica was authorized to procure critical equipment through direct negotiations. Close cooperation with transmission system operators from Ukraine, Romania, and other European countries proved highly effective, allowing the transmission line to be restored on 28 March 2026, just five days after the incident.
• Accelerated deployment of renewable energy infrastructure. Temporary exemptions from the Urban Planning Code enabled the rapid installation of energy storage and balancing systems without lengthy construction permit procedures. This significantly reduced implementation timelines for renewable energy projects.
• Demand reduction measures. A nationwide electricity-saving plan reduced electricity consumption by approximately 3%, preserving vital resources during peak demand periods.

The measures adopted under the state of emergency in the petroleum products sector produced the most visible results for citizens. While on 26 March there were 182 filling stations reporting diesel shortages, after the balancing measures were introduced this number fell to only 41 stations, representing 6.9% of the total.

The measures included:

• Reducing the fuel price calculation period from 14 days to 7 days. This allowed importers to better reflect actual acquisition costs and resume fuel deliveries. Removing this measure now and returning to the previous 14-day calculation period would once again discourage imports in an extremely volatile international market. Conversely, should international petroleum prices continue to decline—as observed following the recently announced ceasefire in the Middle East—the seven-day calculation period will enable price reductions to reach consumers more quickly.
• Targeted financial relief for Lukoil-Moldova LLC. Existing funds belonging to the company were temporarily unblocked exclusively for the purchase of fuel intended for the domestic market. The impact was immediate: the company’s fuel stocks increased from 125 tonnes to more than 712 tonnes, while daily sales rose from approximately 17,000 litres to over 241,000 litres.
• Measures to prevent panic buying. Fuel sales in portable containers were temporarily limited to a maximum of 20 litres, effectively curbing panic stockpiling and stabilizing daily consumption at approximately 1,500 tonnes per day.

An important objective of the crisis management strategy was also to protect the agricultural sector, as this period of instability coincided with critical stages of seasonal agricultural campaigns. Energy security is directly linked to food security; therefore, diesel reserves allocated for agricultural operations were continuously monitored in order to identify and prevent major shortages affecting farmers.

Although the transmission line has been restored, significant risks remain in the energy sector.

The Easter holiday period traditionally brings increased population mobility and, consequently, significantly higher fuel consumption resulting from intensified domestic and cross-border travel. At the same time, the seasonal shutdown of combined heat and power (CHP) plants may reduce cogeneration capacity by 200–220 MW. Furthermore, April is expected to see the resumption of full industrial activity across several sectors, leading to additional growth in electricity demand. Although the fuel market has now stabilized with available reserves covering approximately 6–7 days of consumption, there remains a tangible risk that these reserves could gradually decline.

Maintaining the state of emergency throughout the Easter period therefore represents a proportionate and strategically prudent measure, ensuring that the Government retains the legal tools necessary to prevent any disruption during a period of heightened vulnerability.

This decision is also justified by the need to respond rapidly to a combination of external factors capable of evolving in a cascading manner. These include continued instability in the Middle East, where disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz continue to place pressure on global oil and gas supply chains. Although the ceasefire has contributed to lower international prices, both national and international assessments indicate that price developments and stock levels in the coming weeks will largely depend on the restoration of maritime transport and the reopening of key shipping routes.

In parallel, the Government is working with Members of Parliament on legislative amendments aimed at placing states of emergency and crisis management activities under enhanced parliamentary oversight. At the same time, consideration is being given to revising the legal framework governing the alert state, allowing for greater flexibility in its duration and expanding the range of measures that may be applied, thereby ensuring faster and more effective responses to future crises.